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The authors have produced a handsome book of encyclopaedic dimensions 
matched with an equally large price tag. Its sheer weight presents a physical 
challenge when reading and it may have been wiser rather to present the work in 
two or three more manageable volumes. The narrative takes the form of a 
chronicle. Steenkamp and Heitman deftly build the text around the personal 
accounts of the officers and men who served in the South African Defence Force’s 
(SADF) 61 Mechanised Battalion Group during the Border War and after that, with 
the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) for a decade into the new 
democratic South Africa. In constructing the narrative, they place more emphasis 
on personal accounts than on primary archival material, but the extent is difficult to 
gauge as the book lacks a comprehensive bibliography or referencing system.  
Mobility conquers assumes the role of a semi-official/regimental history. 
Official histories play an important role in laying the foundation stone for the 
historiography of a military campaign. The absence of an official history creates a 
historiographical lacuna unless interested parties outside of government are 
prepared to fill the void. Fortunately, passionate interest groups have come to the 
fore on occasion to rescue our military 
history. Decades ago, General George Brink 
facilitated Neil Orpen in bringing out the 
semi-official South African forces World 
War II,1 thereby rescuing the work of the 
Union War Histories Section (UWHS) when 
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officialdom cancelled the excellent series in 1961.2 In similar fashion, a strong 
combined team consisting of the Regimental Association of 61 Mechanised 
Battalion, together with former veterans of the unit, and two well-known authors, 
have stepped into the breach.  
The book makes good use of a ‘history from below’ technique. The 
memory combination of leaders and ordinary soldiers makes for a convincing 
narrative, injecting the text with an immediacy of the events as they unfolded. 
Commanders and those they commanded sit side by side on the pages, giving their 
unique eyewitness accounts of the battlefield and adding greatly to the debate of 
determining what had happened. The script treats the reader to the first-hand 
experiences of the ordinary soldier who views his war through a keyhole, 
interspersed with those of the generals and commanders who had a superior overall 
view of the battle. The authors successfully manage the difficult task of weaving 
together the tapestry of personal accounts with their commentary of the events. The 
result is compelling writing which captures the danger, immediacy, and at times, 
the sheer terror and tragedy of the experiences. In doing so, Steenkamp and 
Heitman perform an invaluable service of recording first-hand accounts, which 
would have been lost to future generations. The book becomes a valuable primary 
source on which future historians will build their research.  
In an exercise that transcends that of a mere chronicle, the book seeks out 
the historical roots of manoeuvre doctrine adopted by the SADF in general, and 61 
Mechanised Battalion in particular. It also offers valuable insight into the 
technological development of a suitable armoured personnel carrier, the Ratel. Its 
introduction was the central component giving 61 Mechanised Battalion its 
mobility and protection for the infantry in the fire zone. The Ratel, which was a 
technological breakthrough for the South Africans, was a major driver behind the 
SADF’s rediscovery of manoeuvre-type warfare. However, the book misses a trick 
when a deeper analysis would have revealed that the SADF owed much of its 
genetic material to the armies of the two Boer Republics and the Union Defence 
Force (UDF). It was the Boer abhorrence of wasting lives needlessly in futile 
frontal attacks and their preference to live to fight another day which gave birth to 
their predilection for manoeuvre warfare. Typically, the Boers sought to dislodge 
the enemy from his chosen battlefield and make him fight at a time and place of 
their choosing. Once the battlefield got too hot, the Boers would mount up on their 
horses, and by using superior mobility, escaped the numerically superior British, 
after inflicting a disproportionate amount of casualties. This style of warfare 
resonates strongly with that conducted during the Border War. 
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Overlooked too, is the debt owed to the UDF in developing South African 
manoeuvre doctrine in the First World War, the inter-war years and the Second 
World War. South Africa built a world-class armoured car industry during these 
periods. Emerging manoeuvre doctrine saw the rapid conquest of German South 
West Africa in 1915 and much of German East Africa in 1916. The South African 
doctrine often frustrated, if not infuriated, serving British generals and staff officers 
who preferred a more direct and bloody approach to war. Trends toward mobility 
and manoeuvre continued when the South Africans expelled the numerically 
superior Italians from East Africa in 1940–1941. They made use of their superb 
motorised infantry in a combined operations role with light tanks of the fledgling 
South African tank corps. It was in these battles that South Africa shaped 
manoeuvre doctrine around a long-existing abhorrence of unnecessary battlefield 
casualties.  
At times, it seems that the authors would have us believe that the South 
African preference and practice of manoeuvre warfare began in the early 1970s. 
The book proffers the influence of two famous inter-war British intellectual 
military commentators, JFC Fuller and BH Liddell Hart. These two gentlemen 
were seen as the spark that ignited the SADF manoeuvrist flame. It is not difficult 
to see why their manoeuvrist doctrine, which promised battlefield success at a 
fraction of the human and material cost of World War One, was attractive to 
Roeland de Vries (one-time commander of 61 Mechanised Battalion) and other 
South Africans who harboured deep traditions of sensitivity to battlefield 
casualties. Mobility would allow manoeuvre, and by skilfully seeking the course of 
least resistance and using the indirect approach, one would be able to appear 
rapidly on the flanks and to the rear of the enemy and inflict a defeat by paralysing 
the will of the opponent.  
The line of thought adopted by the book provides an unwitting insight into 
some of the flaws present in South African manoeuvre doctrine as practiced during 
the Border War. In clearly favouring manoeuvre, the authors are not alone in 
misinterpreting Fuller and Liddell Hart. The antonym of ‘manoeuvre warfare’ is 
‘static warfare’ and not ‘attrition warfare’. Manoeuvre produces opportunities to 
dislocate, unhinge or create circumstances favourable for attrition. It is South 
Africa’s loathing of attrition-type warfare that may provide some answers as to her 
relatively poor showing in static situations such as Sidi Rezegh, Tobruk and 
perhaps Cuito Cuanavale. Manoeuvre alone is not enough to overcome a 
determined, resolute and well-trained enemy. Waging war at the operational level 
becomes a blend of using manoeuvre and attrition in different proportions at 
different times. Too heavy reliance on the physiological effect of manoeuvre 
warfare has often resulted in failure against a resolute enemy who refuses to be 
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intimidated. Brigadier-General JJ Collyer, one-time South African chief of the 
general staff, made the observation back in 1936 about the Boer way of war. His 
reflections provide much insight into South Africa’s less than stellar military 
performance in static situations.  
A reluctance to push home an attack, of which there were several 
remarkable instances in the larger battles of the war, was emphatically not due to 
want of courage, for in this respect the burgher was the equal of any other soldier. 
It was chiefly a consequence of the view that, having repulsed the enemy and 
having inflicted heavy losses upon him, it was merely stupid to give him any 
chance of retaliating in kind. It follows that many tactical successes fell short of 
full result and that the opportunities against an enemy who had been driven off in 
confusion and with heavy losses were allowed to slip by.3 
The ‘hot topic’ for many Border War buffs is Cuito Cuanavale. 
Unfortunately, Mobility conquers offers a conventional approach in assessing the 
SADF performance in that battle, and few new insights emerge. The authors 
dismiss South Africa’s failure/reluctance to capture the town with claims that it 
was not the SADF’s ultimate objective to seize this important communication 
junction. Here, and throughout the text, the book is unapologetic in representing an 
essentially SADF point of view, although it claims to include ‘rare glimpses’ of the 
Angolan/Soviet/Cuban viewpoint. However, on closer inspection, it seems that the 
authors have relied heavily on Vladimir Shubin and his The hot ‘Cold War’: The 
USSR in Southern Africa.4 The paucity of easily available sources representing ‘the 
other side of the hill’ has resulted in an over-reliance on Shubin, leaving the 
narrative bereft of an Angolan and Cuban voice. One cannot help feeling that an 
opportunity has been missed to present a more comprehensive viewpoint of the 
Border War from the opposing side(s). Limited resources may have made it 
impossible to recreate the methodology of the UWHS where Agar-Hamilton 
injected great swathes of the German and Italian viewpoints into the battles of the 
Western Desert. 
In conclusion, Mobility conquers goes beyond that of a mere regimental 
chronicle in its attempt to trace the evolution and development of South African 
mobile doctrine. It tells the story of the Border War through the lens of the 
members of 61 Mechanised Battalion admirably. It stands on less firm ground 
when endeavouring to present views from an ‘enemy’ perspective. The bold 
assertion that the book serves as a blueprint for success in fighting conventional 
war in Africa may be a little ambitious. The book’s true value lies in the capture of 
first-hand accounts of the battles for posterity. In doing so, the authors have created 
an absorbing account of the Border War. A book of this magnitude is at risk of 
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becoming cumbersome. However, it emerges as one of the best books in this genre, 
and despite its intimidating size, one is compelled to read it from cover to cover. 
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